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Abstract— We propose a new classification for multi-agent
learning algorithms, with each league of players characterized
by both their possible strategies and possible beliefs. Using this
classification, we review the optimality of existing algorithms
and discuss some insights that can be gained. We propose an
incremental improvement to the existing algorithms that seems
to achieve average payoffs that are at least the Nash equilibrium
payoffs in the long-run against fair opponents.
I. INTRODUCTION
The topic of learning in multi-agent environments has
received increasing attention over the past several years. Game
theorists have begun to examine learning models in their study
of repeated games, and reinforcement learning researchers
have begun to extend their single-agent learning models to
the multiple-agent case. As traditional models and methods
from these two fields are adapted to tackle the problem of
multi-agent learning, the central issue of optimality is worth
revisiting. What do we expect a successful learner to do?
A. Matrix games and Nash equilibrium
From the game theory perspective, the repeated game is
a generalization of the traditional one-shot game, or matrix
game. In the one-shot game, two or more players meet,
choose actions, receive their rewards based on the simultane-
ous actions taken, and the game ends. The   -player matrix
game is defined as a reward matrix  for each player,
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which is a probability distribution over the possible actions,
and receives reward based on the joint action taken. Some
traditional examples of single-shot matrix games are shown in
Figure 1.
The traditional assumption is that each player has no prior
knowledge about the other player. Thus there is no opportunity
to tailor our choice of action to best respond to the opponent’s
predicted action. We cannot make any true predictions. As is
standard in the game theory literature, it is thus reasonable to
assume that the opponent is fully rational and chooses actions
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Fig. 1. Some common examples of single-shot matrix games.
that are in its best interest. In return, we must play a best
response to the opponent’s choice of action.
Definition I.1. A best response function for player ﬀ ,
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for player ﬀ , given that the other players are playing the
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
is the set of all possible
policies for agent ﬀ .
If all players are playing best responses to the other players’
strategies, .

'
C;
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.E

%SMOﬀ , then the game is said to be in
Nash equilibrium.
Definition I.2. A Nash equilibrium is a joint policy . such
that for every agent ﬀ , .
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% .
Once all players are playing by a Nash equilibrium, no
single player has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from his
equilibrium policy. Any two-player matrix game can be solved
for its Nash equilibria using quadratic programming, and a
player can choose an optimal strategy in this fashion, given
prior knowledge of the game structure. Of course, this process
may take computational time that is exponential in the number
of actions. Another problem arises when there exist multiple
Nash equilibria. If the players do not manage to coordinate on
one equilibrium joint policy, then they may all end up worse
off. The Hawk-Dove game shown in Figure 1(c) is a good
example of this problem. The two Nash equilibria occur at
(1,2) and (2,1), but if the players do not coordinate, they may
end up playing a joint action (1,1) and receive 0 reward.
B. Stochastic games and reinforcement learning
Despite these problems, there is general agreement that
Nash equilibrium is an appropriate solution concept for one-
shot games. In contrast, for repeated games there are a range
of different perspectives. Repeated games generalize one-
shot games by assuming that the players repeat the matrix
game over many time periods. Researchers in reinforcement
learning view repeated games as a special case of stochastic,
or Markov, games. Researchers in game theory, on the other
hand, view repeated games as an extension of their theory of
one-shot matrix games. The resulting frameworks are similar,
but with a key difference in their treatment of game history.
Reinforcement learning researchers often focus their attention
on choosing a single stationary policy . that will maximize
the learner’s expected rewards in all future time periods given
that we are in time T , UWVYX[Z]\Z ^_"`badc _ E a

_
 
.% , where e
may be finite or infinite, and . ﬁf/(1
 $
% . In the infinite time-
horizon case, we often include the discount factor gihjckhPl .
Under the general stochastic game framework, the policy .
also depends on the state m	'kn of the agent. Thus the policy
. becomes a mapping from states n to action distributions,
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Littman [1] analyzes this framework for zero-sum games,
proving convergence to the Nash equilibrium for his minimax-
Q algorithm playing against another minimax-Q agent. Claus
and Boutilier [2] examine cooperative games where   ﬁ   ,
and Hu and Wellman [3] focus on general-sum games. These
algorithms share the common goal of finding and playing a
Nash equilibrium. Littman [4] and Hall and Greenwald [5]
further extend this approach to consider variants of Nash
equilibrium for which convergence can be guaranteed. Bowl-
ing and Veloso [6] and Nagayuki et al } [7] propose to relax
the mutual optimality requirement of Nash equilibrium by
considering rational agents, which always learn to play a
stationary best-response to their opponent’s strategy, even if
the opponent is not playing an equilibrium strategy. The
motivation is that it allows our agents to act rationally even
if the opponent is not acting rationally because of physical
or computational limitations. Fictitious play [8] is a similar
algorithm from game theory.
C. Game theoretic perspective of repeated games
As alluded to in the previous section, game theorists often
take a more general view of optimality in repeated games.
The key difference is the treatment of the history of actions
taken in the game. Recall that in the stochastic game model,
we took policies to be .  ﬁP/(1
 ~

% for repeated games, or
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% for general stochastic games. Here we
redefine . 
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a is the set of all possible histories of length T . Histories
are observations of joint actions,  a ﬁ  -  !-OE  ! a E

% . Player
ﬀ ’s strategy at time T is then expressed as . D mt! a E

% . Policies
are now maps from histories and states to action distributions,
rather than simply maps from states to action distributions.
For repeated games, policies are simply maps from histories
to action distributions, . J % O /(1  $9 % . In essence, we
are endowing our agent with memory.
Moreover, the agent ought to be able to form beliefs about
the opponent’s strategy, and these beliefs ought to converge to
the opponent’s actual strategy given sufficient learning time.
For the repeated game case, we define  J %  /(1  ~ E  %
to be player ﬀ ’s belief about the opponent’s strategy given the
observed history  . Then a learning path is defined to be a
sequence of histories, beliefs, and personal strategies. Now we
can define the Nash equilibrium of a repeated game in terms
of our personal strategy and our beliefs about the opponent. If
our prediction about the opponent’s strategy is accurate, then
we can choose an appropriate best-response strategy. If this
holds for all players in the game, then we are guaranteed to
be in Nash equilibrium.
Proposition I.3. A learning path
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Nash equilibrium iff the following two conditions hold:
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time, our belief about the opponent’s strategy converges
to the opponent’s actual strategy.
However, Nachbar and Zame [9] show that this requirement
of simultaneous prediction and optimization is impossible to
achieve, given certain assumptions about our possible strate-
gies and possible beliefs. We can never design an agent that
will learn to both predict the opponent’s future strategy and
optimize over those beliefs at the same time.
Despite this fact, if we do not insist on achieving Nash
equilibrium, we can hope to attain other forms of solutions.
Instead of requiring Nash equilibrium, we may simply hope to
achieve rewards that are almost as good the rewards obtained
by the best-response stationary policy over time against any
opponent. In the game theory literature, this concept is often
called universal consistency. Fudenburg and Levine [8] and
Auer, Cesa-Bianchi, Freund, and Schapire [11] [12] indepen-
dently show that an exponentially weighted mixture algorithm
(dubbed exponential fictitious play and Exp3 by the respective
authors) exhibits universal consistency from the game theory
and machine learning perspectives. This type of result insures
that we will not play too badly by aiming to minimize our
regret, which is the difference between our expected total
payoffs at time T and the actual payoff is we had played
an optimal policy taken from some class of policies. For
universal consistency, this comparison class is the class of
stationary policies. Clearly, if we could model the opponent
and adaptively choose the best response in each time period,
we could achieve higher rewards than a player that can only
play stationary policies, albeit with the benefit of hindsight.
However, these results give us a good lower bound on our
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF MULTI-AGENT LEARNING ALGORITHMS UNDER OUR NEW
CLASSIFICATION.
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minimax-Q, Nash-Q Bully

3
Godfather

 
-learning ( ),
(WoLF-)PHC,
fictitious play

3
Exp3
performance and are useful as a benchmark for testing future
algorithms. Against unknown opponents utilizing complex
strategies, universally consistent policies may also be a good
choice for guiding our play.
II. A NEW CLASSIFICATION
We propose a general classification that categorizes algo-
rithms by the cross-product of their possible strategies and
their possible beliefs about the opponent’s strategy,  
 .
An agent’s possible strategies can be classified based upon the
amount of history it has in memory, from L to   . Given
more memory, the agent can formulate more complex policies,
since policies are maps from histories to action distributions.
We can classify agents from L to   based upon the
amount of memory they possess. L agents are memoryless
and can only play stationary policies. Agents that can recall
the actions from the previous time period are classified as  
and can execute reactive policies. At the other extreme,  
agents have unbounded memory and can formulate ever more
complex strategies as the game is played over time. Finally,
in between these extremes are  a agents, which possess up to
T periods of history.
An agent’s belief classification mirrors the strategy classifi-
cation in the obvious way. Agents that believe their opponent
is memoryless are classified as

 players,

a players believe
that the opponent bases its strategy on the previous T -periods
of play, and so forth. Although not explicitly stated, most
existing algorithms make assumptions and thus hold beliefs
about the types of possible opponents in the world. These
assumptions are embodied in the kinds of beliefs they hold
about the opponent.
We can think of each 


a as a different league of
players, with players in each league roughly equal to one
another in terms of their capabilities. Clearly some leagues
contain less capable players than others. We can thus define a
fair opponent as an opponent from an equal or lesser league.
The idea is that new learning algorithms should ideally be
designed to beat any fair opponent.
Definition II.1. A fair opponent for a player in league  
 a
is any player from a league R


a
 , where mqpbfm and TRpbT .
A. The key role of beliefs
Within each league, we assume that players are fully rational
in the sense that they can fully use their available histories to
construct their future policy. However, an important observa-
tion is that the definition of full rationality depends on their
beliefs about the opponent. If we believe that our opponent
is a memoryless player, then even if we are an   player,
our fully rational strategy is to simply model the opponent’s
stationary strategy and play our stationary best response. Thus,
our belief capacity and our history capacity are inter-related.
Without a rich set of possible beliefs about our opponent,
we cannot make good use of our available history. Similarly,
and perhaps more obviously, without a rich set of historical
observations, we cannot hope to model complex opponents.
B. Discussion of current algorithms
Many of the existing algorithms fall within the  



league. As discussed in the previous section, the problem with
these players is that even though they have full access to the
history, their fully rational strategy is stationary due to their
limited belief set. A general example of a  

(
 player is
the policy hill climber (PHC). It maintains a policy and updates
the policy based upon its history in an attempt to maximize
its rewards. Originally PHC was created for stochastic games,
and thus each policy also depends on the current state m . In
our repeated games, there is only one state.
For agent ﬀ , Policy Hill Climbing (PHC) proceeds as fol-
lows:
1. Let  and  be the learning rates. Initialize
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The basic idea of PHC is that the

-values help us to define
a gradient upon which we execute hill-climbing. Bowling and
Veloso’s WoLF-PHC (Win-or-Lose-Fast-PHC) [6] modifies
PHC by adjusting  depending on whether the agent is
“winning” or “losing.” True to their league, PHC players play
well against stationary opponents.
At the opposite end of the spectrum, Littman and Stone [13]
propose algorithms in L

(
 and  >
)  that are leader
strategies in the sense that they choose a fixed strategy and
hope that their opponent will “follow” by learning a best re-
sponse to that fixed strategy. Their “Bully” algorithm chooses
a fixed memoryless stationary policy, while “Godfather” has
memory of the last time period. Opponents included normal

-learning and


players, which are similar to

-learners
except that they explicitly learn using one period of memory
because they believe that their opponent is also using memory
to learn. The interesting result is that “Godfather” is able to
achieve non-stationary equilibria against
 
in the repeated
prisoner’s dilemna game, with rewards for both players that
are higher than the stationary Nash equilibrium rewards. This
demonstrates the power of having belief models. However,
because these algorithms do not have access to more than one
period of history, they cannot begin to attempt to construct
statistical models the opponent. “Godfather” works well be-
cause it has a built-in best response to


learners rather than
attempting to learn a best response from experience.
Finally, Hu and Wellman’s Nash-Q and Littman’s minimax-
Q are classified as   
  players, because even though
they attempt to learn the Nash equilibrium through experience,
their play is fixed once this equilibrium has been learned.
Furthermore, they assume that the opponent also plays a fixed
stationary Nash equilibrium, which they hope is the other
half of their own equilibrium strategy. These algorithms are
summarized in Table 1.
C. Simple strategies are often good strategies
It is interesting to observe that sometimes the “dumb”
strategy results in better rewards than a more elaborate strategy
that takes into account beliefs about the other agent. For
example, “Bully” is essentially a “dumb” strategy, since it is
memoryless and plays one action regardless of the opponent’s
actions. However, in a game with multiple equilibria, “Bully”
is always able to obtain its preferred equilibrium point against
a suitably “smart” opponent. This is an important attribute due
to the fact that most repeated games have multiple equilibria,
each of which may result in very different payoffs for the
different players. The “folk theorem” [8] of game theory
shows that for infinitely repeated games, there are almost
always infinitely many Nash equilibrium points. Using various
refinements of Nash equilibrium, we can narrow the set of
good equilibrium points by choosing those which are more
robust. Even so, it is often the case that each player will prefer
a different equilibrium point due to their different individual
payoff functions, again causing a coordination problem. In
these cases, “dumb” players such as “Bully” may actually do
quite well, as long as they are able to analyze the game in
advance and choose their preferred equilibrium point.
The idea that simple strategies are good strategies extends
further than this. In many cases, it is beneficial for a player
to allow its opponent to recognize its policy. In coordination
games, it is important to announce one’s intended play. In gen-
eral, this is true for any game that requires cooperative action
to attain a mutually beneficial Nash equilibrium. For example,
in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, one possible Nash equilibrium
is attained when both players play the Tit-for-Tat strategy:
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 . However, in
order to learn to play this policy, an agent must first recognize
that its opponent is playing Tit-for-Tat. Luckily, Tit-for-Tat is
a relatively simple policy, mapping only one period of history
to a deterministic action, .
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recognize this strategy using minimal exploration. However,
this task would be much more complicated if the opponent’s
strategy was 1) probabilistic, or 2) depended on a large
amount of history. Prediction of such strategies would require
copius amounts of data from previous play. We would also
need to assume that the opponent’s policy remains relatively
stationary during this learning period. Without knowledge of
the opponent’s policy, we cannot choose an optimal response
in these coordination games, and we would have to settle for
a sub-optimal equilibrium point.
III. A NEW CLASS OF PLAYERS
As discussed above, most existing algorithms do not form
beliefs about the opponent beyond

 . None of these ap-
proaches are able to capture the essence of game-playing,
which is a world of threats, deceits, and generally out-witting
the opponent. We wish to open the door to such possibilities
by designing learners that can model the opponent and use
that information to achieve better rewards. Ideally we would
like to design an algorithm in   
L  that is able to win
or come to an equilibrium against any fair opponent. Since
this is impossible [9], we start by proposing an algorithm in
the league  

)
 that plays well against a restricted class
of opponents. Since many of the current algorithms are best-
response players, we choose an opponent class such as PHC,
which is a good example of a best-response player in  

6
 .
We will demonstrate that our algorithm indeed beats its PHC
opponents and in fact does well against most of the existing
fair opponents.
A. A new algorithm: PHC-Exploiter
Our algorithm is different from most previous work in that
we are explicitly modeling the opponent’s learning algorithm
and not simply his current policy. In particular, we would like
to model players from  

9
 . Since we are in  

9
 , it
is rational for us to construct such models because we believe
that the opponent is learning and adapting to us over time
using its history. The idea is that we will “fool” our opponent
into thinking that we are stupid by playing a decoy policy
for a number of time periods and then switch to a different
policy that takes advantage of their best response to our decoy
policy. From a learning perspective, the idea is that we adapt
much faster than the opponent; in fact, when we switch away
from our decoy policy, our adjustment to the new policy is
immediate. In contrast, the   
²  opponent adjusts its
policy by small increments and is furthermore unable to model
our changing behavior. We can repeat this “bait and switch”
cycle ad infinitum, thereby achieving infinite total rewards as
T
 ³
. The opponent never catches on to us because it
believes that we only play stationary policies.
A good example of a   
  player is PHC. Bowling
and Veloso showed that in self-play, a restricted version of
WoLF-PHC always reaches a stationary Nash equilibrium in
two-player two-action games, and that the general WoLF-PHC
seems to do the same in experimental trials. Thus, in the
long run, a WoLF-PHC player achieves its stationary Nash
equilibrium payoff against any other PHC player. We wish
to do better than that by exploiting our knowledge of the
PHC opponent’s learning strategy. We can construct a PHC-
Exploiter algorithm for agent ﬀ that proceeds like PHC in steps
1-2b, and then continues as follows:
c. Observing action - a
E
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at time T , update our history  and
calculate an estimate of the opponent’s policy:
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d. Update  by estimating the learning rate of the PHC
opponent:
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Note that we derive both the opponent’s learning rate 
and the opponent’s policy ´.E R m¢% from estimates using the
observable history of actions. If we assume the game matrix
is public information, then we can solve for the equilibrium
strategy
´
.
H

 
m¢% , otherwise we can run WoLF-PHC for some
finite number of time periods to obtain an estimate this equi-
librium strategy. The main idea of this algorithm is that we take
full advantage of all time periods in which we are winning,
that is, when ¦
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IV. EXAMPLE AND ANALYSIS
The PHC-Exploiter algorithm is based upon PHC and thus
exhibits the same behavior as PHC in games with a single
pure Nash equilibrium. Both agents generally converge to the
single pure equilibrium point. The interesting case arises in
competitive games where the only equilibria require mixed
strategies, as discussed by Singh, Kearns, and Mansour [14]
and Bowling and Veloso [6]. Matching pennies, shown in
Figure 1(a), is one such game. In this type of game, PHC-
Exploiter is able to use its model of the opponent’s learning
algorithm to choose better actions to play.
In the full knowledge case where we know our opponent’s
policy .

and learning rate   at every time period, we can
prove that a PHC-Exploiter learning algorithm will guarantee
us unbounded reward in the long run playing games such
as matching pennies. The central idea is that play will keep
cycling, alternating between stages where we are gaining high
reward and stages where we are losing some reward but setting
up the system for another stage of high gain.
Proposition IV.1. In the zero-sum game of matching pennies,
where the only Nash equilibrium requires the use of mixed
strategies, PHC-Exploiter is able to achieve unbounded re-
wards as T »³ against any PHC opponent given that play
follows the cycle ° defined by the arrowed segments shown
in Figure 2.
Play proceeds along °>µ , °>¼ , then jumps from (0.5, 0) to
(1,0), follows the line segments to (0.5, 1), then jumps back
to (0, 1). Given a point  ½ !~¾b% ﬁ  .  Heads %~!$. O Heads %J% on
the graph in Figure 2, where .
D 
Heads % is the probability by
which player ﬀ plays Heads, we know that our expected reward
is
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We consider each part separately. In the losing section, we let
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Similarly, we can show that we receive 1/4 reward over ° µ .
Thus, ¿
(
 S½
!$¾b%~À"T
ﬁ
ldÅÈi¹g , and we have shown that we
receive a payoff greater than the Nash equilibrium payoff of
zero over every cycle. It is easy to see that play will indeed
follow the cycle ° to a good approximation, depending on
the size of 

. In the next section, we demonstrate that we can
estimate .

and   sufficiently well from past observations,
thus eliminating the full knowledge requirements that were
used to ensure the cyclic nature of play above.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We used the PHC-Exploiter algorithm described above to
play against several PHC variants in different iterated matrix
games, including matching pennies, prisoner’s dilemna, and
rock-paper-scissors. Here we give the results for the matching
pennies game analyzed above, playing against WoLF-PHC.
We used a window of ¸ÉﬁjÊ gYgºg time periods to estimate the
opponent’s current policy .

and the opponent’s learning rate


. As shown in Figure 2, the play exhibits the cyclic nature
that we predicted. The two solid vertical lines indicate periods
in which our PHC-Exploiter player is winning, and the dashed,
roughly diagonal, lines indicate periods in which it is losing.
In the analysis given in the previous section, we derived an
upper bound for our total rewards over time, which was 1/6 for
each time step. Since we have to estimate various parameters
in our experimental run, we do not achieve this level of reward.
We gain an average of 0.08 total reward for each time period.
Figure 3 plots the total reward for our PHC-Exploiter agent
over time. The periods of winning and losing are very clear
from this graph. Further experiments tested the effectiveness of
PHC-Exploiter against other fair opponents, including itself.
Against all the existing fair opponents shown in Table 1, it
achieved at least its average equilibrium payoff of zero in the
long-run.
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Fig. 2. Theoretical (top), Empirical (bottom). The cyclic play is evident in
our empirical results, where we play a PHC-Exploiter player 1 against a PHC
player 2.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have presented a new classification for
multi-agent learning algorithms and suggested an algorithm
that seems to dominate existing algorithms from the fair
opponent leagues when playing certain games. Ideally, we
would like to create an algorithm in the league   
  that
provably dominates larger classes of fair opponents in any
game. Moreover, all of the discussion contained within this
paper dealt with the case of iterated matrix games. We would
like to extend our framework to more general stochastic games
with multiple states and multiple players. Finally, it would be
interesting to find practical applications of these multi-agent
learning algorithms.
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